I INTRODUCTION
This article asks whether diversity of corporate board membership is desirable and how that diversity can best be achieved. While recognising that diversity is broader than gender diversity, this article focuses on gender debates, providing a framework for analysis of a topical issue. The authors take the view that board gender diversity represents both governance and community expectations but that change is progressing slowly in Australia. Hence, arguments are presented both for and against board gender diversity, presenting the state of play, while also disclosing the authors' position that board gender diversity brings greater heterogeneity to boards which aids decision-making. The authors set the article within the Australian context but provide international comparisons and a historical framework. While the focus is on corporate board gender diversity, the authors provide examples from other domains, such as the not-for-profit, university and government sectors. Their conclusion is that while, in the Australian jurisdiction, progress is being made on board gender diversity, there is still a long way to go. In a voluntary system such as Australia's increases in diversity have occurred belatedly, recently and from a low base. This article is timely given the release of the Women on Boards' Guidelines for Gender Balance Performance and Reporting Australia 1 which outline five key points on how all types of organisations can improve career opportunities for women that will lead to more women being available for board positions. The Guidelines provide a framework that encourages cultural change in public and private entities. While adoption of the Guidelines is voluntary, it is envisaged that they will be used for corporate governance reporting to shareholders in annual reports. In brief, the Guidelines recommend collecting and reporting data on women in the workplace and their training and development for leadership positions.
2 While it might be argued that no new insights on gender diversity on boards are provided by the Guidelines, they underscore the urgency of the issue in today's world.
II DIVERSITY DEFINED
Social diversity is the result of the interaction of the numerous human attributes differentiating individuals and groups. Castania suggests that [i] mplicit in this definition [of diversity] is the awareness of our group identities as well as our individual differences. We are unique as individuals, while our group identities determine our historical inclusion or exclusion. We often see ourselves only as individuals, even though historically we have been treated based on our group identities.
performance: this occurrence is referred to as 'reverse causation'. 6 Whilst the application of reverse causation is specific to gender diversity, the extension of the noted arguments to other elements of diversity is not unreasonable. Studies have revealed that successful corporations tend to appoint more female directors and several studies have addressed this notion directly. An example is Farrell and Hersch, 7 who studied a sample of between 266 and 300 Fortune 500 and Service 500 firms between 1990 and 1999. Their study revealed that firms achieving strong profit results or return on assets appointed more female directors. 8 Adams and Ferreira concluded that, ' [a]lthough a positive relation between gender diversity in the boardroom and firm performance is often cited in the popular press, it is not robust to any of our methods of addressing the endogeneity of gender diversity'.
9 Dobbin and Jung's later research supported the finding of Adams and Ferreira 'that the cross-sectional positive relationship found between board diversity and corporate performance is likely spurious -a consequence of reverse causation'.
10

B The Post Hoc Ergo Propter Hoc Fallacy
'After this, therefore because of this' is a fallacy of reasoning that correlation proves causation. 11 All other things being equal, a result following an action (with identified correlation) is insufficient to prove that the result is caused by the action (causation). Unless all other variables can be identified and controlled, it may be unreasonable to conclude that a corporation's improved performance has been achieved as a result of recruiting a more diverse board. Because of the innumerable variables impacting upon the performance of corporations, concluding that a diverse board improves corporate performance is hence difficult.
Similarly, the sibling maxim cum hoc ergo propter hoc, meaning 'with this, therefore because of this', is also a fallacy of reasoning: two things occurring together do not necessarily have a cause-and-effect relationship.
12 This argument has also been applied to board diversity to assert that improved profits may not be caused by an increase in female directorships.
13
C Tokenism
'Tokenism' refers to situations where the interests of minority groups are promoted for political reasons rather than diversity being embraced as an opportunity, with all talent sources being considered with a view to recruiting the most effective mix of qualified individuals. In cases of 'token representation', minority group representatives 'face expectations that make it difficult to perform to their potential' and 'face pressures that may adversely affect their performance', such as additional scrutiny from majority members and the perception that their position is one of representation and not one based upon individual merit.
14 D
Stereotype-threat
Research suggests that 'experimental manipulation' to increase the prominence of minority group representation may have negative repercussions on the performance of minority members (and in turn the board and the corporation). 15 Based on the fact that more diverse views need to be taken into consideration it becomes harder to develop strategy and to make board 12 decisions. The influence of experimental manipulation and stereotypes makes minority group representatives feel they are being judged as a group rather than as individuals, thus reducing performance.
16
E Problem-Solving Efficacy
Some scholars contend that '[m]ixed gender and racial groups may divide, and diversity may elicit group conflict that interferes with efficacy. Diversity in race, ethnicity, and, to a lesser extent, sex, tends to bring about group conflict, hinder communication, and interfere with cooperation, thereby lowering performance'. 17 Research analysing the impact of diverse boards on corporate performance -via the diminished interaction and problem-solving of a diverse group -is largely divided as studies have produced inconclusive and inconsistent results.
18
F Research Evidence that Performance Is Unrelated to Diversity
Adams and Ferreira and Dobbin and Jung rebuff conclusions made on the basis of previous studies indicating a causal link between gender diversity and performance. They state that those studies 'cannot be "given causal interpretations" because they did not account for endogeneity -inclusion of which likely would have resulted in a negative effect'. 19 Farrell and Hersch's study of between 266 and 300 Fortune 500 and Service 500 firms over 10 years from 1990 to 1999 revealed 'reverse causation' and the appointment of female directors by companies experiencing a successful period. 20 19 Adams and Ferreira, above n 9, 292, 306, cited in Dobbin and Jung, above n 6, 810, 817. 20 Farrell and Hersch, above n 7, 85, cited in Dobbin and Jung, above n 6, 819. 21 Ibid. 22 Adams and Ferreira, above n 9, 308, cited in Dobbin and Jung, above n 6, 819-20. negative effects found in certain studies may be real', and hypothesised 'a new mechanism to explain this effect: shareholder bias'.
23
G
Dobbin and Jung's 'Institutional Bias' Theory for Male Board Domination
Dobbin and Jung's 2011 theory of 'institutional investor bias' (or shareholder bias) suggests that corporations may suffer share price reductions as a result of taking progressive action on gender diversity. 24 In this view, sharemarket performance is equated to corporate performance. Dobbin and Jung hypothesised that the control wielded by institutional investors, as major players in equities markets, directly affected company share prices and that gender bias drove some of their strategic decisions. 25 Institutional investors held 80 per cent of the shares in the largest companies of Dobbin and Jung's sample, 26 which reflected American shareholding at the time. 27 Their research considered, among several hypotheses, the impact of board gender composition on the buy and sell decisions of institutional investors. 28 As active traders, institutional investors develop buy and sell strategies, with concern for matters such as in changes in board composition.
29 Dobbin and Jung cited survey results concluding that investors generally believe that 'women lack the human capital and business experience to be board members', hypothesizing that 'investors may react negatively to firms that appoint women board members'. 30 They discovered that 'institutional investors do promote gender diversity on boards through shareholder proposals favoring diversity'. 31 Their findings noted that increases in board 23 Dobbin and Jung, above n 6, 820. 24 Ibid 811, 820. 25 Ibid 820-5. 26 Ibid 825-6. 27 Ibid 836. 28 gender diversity do not affect subsequent profitability. However, critically, Dobbin and Jung's study revealed that, despite stable profits, 'an increase in gender diversity on boards is followed by a significant decrease in stock value '. 32 This observation lends credence to the hypothesis that 'institutional investors may sell the stock of firms that appoint women to their boards not because profits suffer, but because they are biased against women'.
33
IV ARGUMENTS IN FAVOUR OF BOARD GENDER DIVERSITY
Some arguments in favour of board gender diversity are outlined briefly below.
A Board Gender Diversity Leads to Better Corporate Performance
It is argued that, by considering all sources of talent in the recruitment of board directors, progressive corporations with enlightened approaches to diversity achieve improved performance. 34 The Institute of Directors in Ireland believes that the need for gender diversity is just one element of a broader need for diversity in the boardroom which is of paramount importance to the leadership and success of a business and its interests. Diversity should not just be about ensuring the presence of female 32 Ibid (emphasis added). 33 directors, it encompasses much more than that, everything from the skills and expertise of directors to their level of independence from the company, to their age and nationality. 35 Numerous studies have linked diverse boards with improved share prices and profitability, with the majority of research focusing upon the dominant board diversity issue: gender. 36 In 2007, Catalyst, 'a leading non-profit organization with a mission to expand opportunities for women and business', 37 performed a detailed research study which considered the impact of gender diversity on company boards. It was noted that companies with 'more female board representatives' outperformed those with 'the least' female board representatives on each of the following key financial indicators: return on equity (by 53 per cent), return on sales (by 42 per cent), and return on invested capital (by 66 per cent). 38 Theoretically, a board representing diverse societal interests achieves improved levels of strategic thinking and risk management. This view is supported in the literature. In a 2002 study, the Conference Board of Canada pointed out the advantages of a diverse board, which included representatives of diverse company owners and stakeholders. 39 It stated that such a board makes better strategic decisions as it is better equipped to rely on diverse views to manage risk and improve strategic planning. 40 Maura Quinn of the Institute of Directors in Ireland is also supportive of board diversity, noting that critical questions are asked by a diverse board and that 'diversity brings a range of perspectives to discussions, helping to avoid the group-think mentality which has been seen in some boards in recent years'. 41 board's oversight' in calling for 'a broader skillset and wider perspective in the board. Again, there is an implied need for more board diversity'.
42
B
Board Gender Diversity Affects Problem-Solving, Teamwork and Decision-Making
Many extend the argument, proposing that a diverse board affects problemsolving efficacy, 43 leading to improved corporate performance. 44 Research suggests that groups with occupational diversity are more effective at problem-solving than those without diversity (homogeneous groups). 45 Furthermore, personality diversity amongst teams improves efficacy by broadening discussions, thus avoiding group-think. In addition, studies found that team work is improved when at critical mass (which is generally considered to be 15 per cent or more) 46 and another study has found that having three or more women on a board can change the dynamics and lead to improved performance. 47 Whilst conceding that correlation does not prove causation, Thomson 57 Upon the rate of female representation reaching levels of around 15 per cent there exists the risk that 'the pace of change will slow and the pressure for change will reduce'. 58 Broderick pointed out that this was the experience of the United States (US) where the number of women on the boards of Fortune 500 companies has remained at 15 per cent for over a decade and she argued that we should not allow this to happen in Australia. 59 Indeed, business leaders increasingly support the notion that for a nation to achieve global success it must utilise and develop its female talent. 60 The European Commissioner, Michel Barnier, states that 'it's not only a question of fairness. The presence of women in the leadership of a country or a region or a business is a question of good governance'.
61
D Corporate Boards should Reflect Different Diversity Paradigms
Some scholars argue that corporate boards should reflect the composition of the community and its demographic make-up for three reasons: to avoid discrimination; for fairness, equity and access; and for the promotion of learning and effectiveness. the dominant paradigms for understanding diversity, focusing the lens on equal opportunity, fair treatment, fair recruitment, and compliance with legislation. 63 The access and legitimacy paradigm reflects the need to accept and celebrate difference, matching the demographics of the corporation to those of the community. 64 The learning and effectiveness paradigm links primary tasks to markets, products, strategies, missions, business practices and cultures, enriching decision-making in governance. 65 Considering the fact that 50.2 per cent of Australia's population is female, 66 but, on 28 May 2014, women accounted for only 18.2 per cent of directorships among Australia's top 200 listed companies, 67 each of these arguments has some currency and they are convincing.
V WHAT IS THE RIGHT GENDER BALANCE?
Evidence suggests that it is theoretically possible to achieve the 'right gender balance' on a corporate board. Those who present such evidence argue that the 'right gender balance' is denoted by a minimum 40 per cent representation of each sex, which can be achieved by either voluntary or mandatory means. 68 Various reference points are relevant when considering optimum corporate board gender balance. Examples of relevant statistical benchmarks include: the percentage of women in the population, the percentage of women in the labour force, or the percentage of women on government boards (in aggregate and/or on each board -see Table 1 in the Appendix to this article for strategies that have been used on government boards). Alternatively, arbitrary percentages, which clearly indicate a move towards absolute equality, may also be argued to provide the 'right gender balance'. Thus, although one can speculate on what the 'right' gender balance is, it is impossible to determine this with precision but the aspiration, worldwide, is to have between 30 and 50 per cent of a particular gender on boards of at least listed companies.
VI
QUOTA LEGISLATION
The concept of quota legislation refers to legislated change that sets a target for the gender percentage on corporate boards to be achieved within a certain timeframe. Governments in several international jurisdictions have elected to phase in gender quotas over different timeframes, passing laws for this purpose; they have adopted variable approaches to sanctions and compliance requirements for companies of differing legal status. However, the approach of these governments has shown little variation concerning gender equality targets for quota legislation (nor has there been substantial variation among the targets of nations pursuing voluntary mechanisms). An international consensus has established that a minimum of 40 per cent of each gender holding directorships on a board represents best practice, as illustrated by some international jurisdictions (discussed below) which have adopted quotas.
A Norway First out of the Blocks
The first corporate board gender quota law in the world was introduced by Norway, through amendments to the Norwegian Public Limited Liability Companies Act. 69 In February 2012, it remained 'the only example of fully implemented legislation (in the sense that the date for meeting the target has passed)'.
70 Norway's model was successful due to the strictness of sanctions supporting its legislation. The ultimate sanction for a company not achieving the mandatory gender quotas is the dissolution or deregistering of the company. The Norwegian legislation demanded that, for 'larger boards, 40% of the members were to be of each gender; a more detailed specification was made for smaller boards (if two or three members, then there should be one of each gender; if four or five members, at least two of each; if six-eight at least three of each; if nine or more then 40%)'. 72 Companies had five years until January 2008 to implement targets.
There remains no room for non-compliance in Norway, and the sanctions ensured rapid results. 73 Norway first mandated gender quotas for publicly listed companies by demanding a minimum of 40 per cent female directorship by 2008 . 74 Public limited companies had until 1 January 2008 to meet the requirements and they were indeed met. Thus, although, as pointed out above, the final consequence for non-compliance was the dissolving of the company, no public limited company has been dissolved on account of the gender rules to date. 78 However, implementation took 10 years, 'from the first government motion until the final implementation of the quota', 79 The achievement of the Norwegian objective encouraged other countries to implement similar quota legislation.
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Impact of Norwegian Legislation on Other Jurisdictions
Norway's success inspired several nations to follow its lead. 85 requiring that '40 per cent of executive board members of the largest publiclytraded companies (quoted on the stock exchange, or those with more than 500 employees, with a turnover exceeding €50 million over the previous three years)' be female, with a deadline of 2016. 89 French law has a transitional period with two phases (20 per cent by 2013 and 40 per cent by 2016) with penalties including 'annulment of board appointments'.
90
A Belgian quota law 91 was implemented via a new article inserted into the Belgian Company Code, requiring a minimum of one-third female and onethird male directors on publicly traded and state-owned company boards, effective from 'the first fiscal year following the publication of the law'. 92 The law was published on 14 September 2011 after being approved on 28 July 2011 and penalties for non-compliance include the '[t]emporary loss of financial and non-financial benefits by board members'.
93
Note presented at European Conference on Equality between Women and Men, Brussels, 19-20 September 2011) <http://ec.europa.eu/justice/gender-equality/files/conference_sept_2011/ background-paper-decision-making_en.pdf>; Armstrong and Walby, above n 5, 6. 87 See also Armstrong and Walby, above n 5, 30-1. 88 94 The changes were implemented in July-August 2011. 95 The law requires that the lowest represented gender on the Boards of Directors and Audit Committees should originally be increased to one-fifth for the first three years after the provisions became law and to at least one-third after that three-year period. Italy's Gender Parity Law applies to 'public limited companies and state-owned companies' and demands 'at least 33% of each gender on their boards (executives and non-executives) by 2015 (with a target of 20% for the transitional period)'. 96 The consequences of non-compliance are severe: companies will receive a warning, with four months grace to rectify the matter. If they fail to achieve quotas the company is fined between €100 000 and €1 million and its audit committee is fined between €20 000 and €100 000, with a further three months to rectify the situation. 97 Continued failure to comply results in removal of the board and audit committee. 101 Spanish quota law differs from most others in that no penalties apply for non-compliance. The government has disclosed, however, that it will 'take compliance into consideration in the awarding of certain public contracts'. 102 It will be interesting to track the statistical progress of board gender-diversity in Spain based on this incentive and in the absence of legal sanctions.
The Malaysian government, in 2004, published strong recommendations for the appointment of a minimum 30 per cent women at 'decision-making levels' for its public and corporate sectors. 103 Following a slow response in the corporate sector, Malaysia announced a Cabinet-approved gender equity quota on 27 June 2011 and gave companies five years to comply. 104 The Prime Minister stated that '[t]his decision reflects that the government today is not only supportive towards women's roles and success, but is also encouraging them to further move ahead in their career'. 105 Furthermore, to ensure the success of the quota, the Malaysian Finance Ministry, the Malaysian Alliance of Corporate Directors, and the Malaysian Directors Academy 'formulate training programmes to prepare those with potential for the board of directors' job'. 106 It should be noted that although it has been widely reported that Malaysia has legislated a quota system, it remains a recommendation only and forms part of the revised Code of Corporate Governance, which took effect in 2012. Over the next decade, inadequacies with voluntary mechanisms may lead other nations to follow suit and implement legislated quotas.
109 Nations electing to pass quota legislation which differs from the strict sanction-based system of Norway may experience a fluctuation in board gender diversity statistics 110 because of the scope given for non-compliance.
C Evaluating Mandatory Quotas to Achieve Gender Diversity
Advantages
Advocates of legislation, in espousing the virtues of quotas, cite research correlating board-level gender diversity and corporate performance. The gender gap has been described as 'both an injustice and a drag on company economic performance'. 111 Quotas have been proven to remedy the issue quickly, with Norway one of the countries providing evidence of this. 112 Goldman Sachs posited that increasing female participation rates would lift Australian GDP by 11 per cent; 113 if female productivity and participation were both raised to levels equivalent to those of males, GDP would increase by 20 per cent 114 Based on this, quota legislation should be considered as an option to ensure that the economic advantage of having more females on boards could be reaped sooner than what would be the case if voluntary targets are achieved through a self-regulatory corporate governance model. To mandate minimum levels of female directorship would cast the net wider than is currently the case, leading to better use of talent and an increase in female productivity and participation. Quotas would remedy the current inequity and injustice of gender imbalance -in principle. If the research correlating gender diversity with corporate performance is relied upon, then the advantages of a legislated quota system in Australia could be substantial. The 109 Forbes Insights, above n 34, 4, 27. 110 promotion of board gender equity would further economic equality between the sexes. According to Forbes in its 2012 Global Diversity Rankings study:
It's worth noting that greater economic equality between men and women has been shown to reduce poverty rates, boost GDP and lead to better governance. In order to improve female participation rates, governments can adopt a number of proven approaches such as flexi-time initiatives, free or subsidized childcare, and tax breaks for married couples when both partners work. Chairpersonship remains male-dominated 122 and a recent study of 'prime insiders' on the Oslo stock exchange -completed by Burson-Marstellerindicates that women account for only 27% of a wider group of prime insiders and only 8% of 'the most trusted' prime insiders within Norway's top companies.
123 Based upon 2010 data -one year after achieving the mandated 40 per cent female directorship target -companies on the Oslo Stock Exchange had female CEO representation of only 2 per cent.
124 Such statistics bring into question the depth of commitment to gender diversity in countries with mandated quota law.
Many companies and commentators oppose legislated gender quotas as they force the appointment of individuals without the necessary qualifications, experience and preparedness, rather than appointments being made on merit.
125 Such appointments are considered a threat to corporate governance structures and performance. Significant research, adjusted for reversecausation, indicates that gender diversity negatively affects corporate performance. 126 As will be seen below, some also believe that the market should judge corporate governance practices; legislation dilutes the effect of that prerogative.
VII
VOLUNTARY REGIME IN AUSTRALIA long as reasons are provided for non-compliance with the national guidelines introduced by the ASX in 2003. This can be done in companies' own timeframes, with minimal government interference, enabling corporate boards to retain discretion in directorship recruitment, and avoid compliance costs and penalties whilst committing to a culture of gender equity by choice.
The approach taken in Australia is set against the background of the diversity debate discussed above. Within the broader societal context of equality and participation, some have observed that the increase in the appointment of women to corporate boards has occurred slowly, starting at the beginning of the women's movement in 1970 and being promoted by changes in the social, economic, political, and competitive environments (see Table 1 in the Appendix). The table illustrates that change occurred in two contexts (defined as the outer context of the social, economic, political and competitive environments and the inner context entailing the structure, corporate culture and political environment within the community). The table shows that the development of board diversity is not a simple linear process, but that actions, reactions and interactions of stakeholders occur in an interlocking manner over time. It is a combination of events at a variety of levels interacting over time as the change process is given legitimacy by people in power on boards who respond to the idea of mentoring and developing mentor and develop women for board positions. Table 1 illustrates how the development of board diversity has occurred in three phases. Phase 1 focused on equal rights for women and girls, with little movement of women onto boards. Phase 1 was revolutionary and radical, with high levels of activity on the streets, in the media, and through publications such as books and journal articles. Phases 2 and 3 were evolutionary. Phase 2 focused on positive actions for women in the workplace, with an emphasis on management rather than governance, but with some women obtaining board positions. The focus was on 'education and equality' for women and girlsequal opportunities for women in society, such as the removal of explicit barriers to the admission and progression of women in the workforce. Phase 3 focused on women seeking power and influence through diversity mainstreaming and through gender access to the boardroom. Each of these periods of change was associated with the election of federal Labor governments.
A The 2009 CAMAC Diversity on Boards of Directors Report
During the financial year 2009/2010, the Australian government commissioned three independent reviews seeking recommendations on listedentity corporate governance practices, with an emphasis on gender diversity. 127 The commissioned reports were:
• 
B Gender Diversity on Australian Boards Compared to Other Countries
Indeed, Australian women represent 45.8 per cent of the total labour force, 131 placing 23 rd among 50 participating nations in Forbes' 2012 'female employment share rank'. 132 The 2011 Australian sex ratio (the number of males per hundred females) was 98.9 across a total population of 22.3 million, meaning that women comprise 51 per cent of the Australian population. 133 However, as pointed out above, at 28 May 2014, only 18.2 per cent of ASX 200 directorships were held by females. 134 The proportion of women on boards in Australia compared to Norway remains low, evidenced by Australia's ranking of 21 among 50 participating countries in Forbes' 2012 Global Diversity Ranking. 135 Forbes commissioned Oxford Economics to build a global ranking model, which was 'unique and first-of-its-kind'. 139 The five best performing nations were Norway (36 per cent), the Philippines (23 per cent) and Sweden (23 per cent), Latvia (22 per cent) and Slovakia (22 per cent). 140 The five worst performing nations were Portugal (0.4 per cent), Japan (0.9 per cent), the United Arab Emirates (0.9 per cent), Korea (1 per cent) and Chile (2.4 per cent).
141 Forbes' study is comprehensive and unique, providing a detailed, comparative analysis of gender diversity around the world; however, data was collected in early 2011 and represents 2008, 2009 or 2010 -meaning that Australia's rapid progress since 2010 is not exhibited in the Forbes results. A less comprehensive but more current study performed by GMI and based upon December 2011 data was released on 8 March 2012 to coincide with International Women's Day. 142 GMI's study revealed that Australia's rate of increase in female directorships during 2011 had elevated it above several nations behind which it had previously lagged. 143 In Part VII below, the authors analyse statistics regarding male and female percentages of directorships for ASX 200 companies in greater detail.
C Australia's Weighted Composite Gender Diversity Ranking
Whilst Australian board-level gender diversity remains well short of international benchmarks, Australia's weighted composite gender diversity ranking is more impressive (12 th ). 144 In order to reach the composite gender diversity rank, four measurable elements of gender diversity were considered and results were weighted to determine the relevant placing for each of the 50 participating countries. The four elements were: female employment share rank ( The composite gender diversity rank may be interpreted as a leading indicator of board gender diversity performance. Its strong performance in the four elements studied suggests that Australia is improving opportunities for minority groups and enhancing diversity in all levels of the economy and corporate life.
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D Cultural Change a Driving Force for Diversity
A change in cultural attitudes, so that the advantages of diversity are recognised and female participation encouraged, will increase the quantity of qualified, experienced female directors in a sustainable and productive manner. Current data demonstrates improvement in Australia's board-level gender diversity, with 22 per cent of all new 2012 ASX 200 board appointments being women (or a total of 41 women). 147 Strong progression towards equitable representation has continued over three years, with 68 female appointments in 2011 (comprising 28 per cent of the total) and 56 (comprising 25 per cent of new appointments) in 2010.
148
E The ASX Corporate Governance Council's Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations
The document entitled Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations with 2010 Amendments was adopted by the ASX Corporate Governance Council, following public consultation. The document came into effect from the first financial year commencing on or after 1 January 2011 149 and, within established principles, addressed diversity-related issues. Principle 2 in the document deals with the issue of structuring the board to add value. Specifically, Principle 2.4 ('The board should establish a nomination committee') 150 requires boards to report upon director recruitment, including 146 No director should be appointed to any board based solely upon the diversity group they represent: O'Brien, above n 120. In order for the talent pool to be fully utilised, opportunities for all individuals -particularly those from under-represented minority groups -to become sufficiently qualified and prepared for directorship is essential. 147 AICD, above n 57. 148 Ibid. 149 ASX Corporate Governance Council, Governance Principles, above n 127, 7. procedures to consider talent from diverse sources. In its 2009 report, CAMAC had recommended that 'a starting point in any move to encourage greater gender (or other) diversity on boards is to … make their appointment processes more transparent and to formalise their processes for keeping board composition under review in the light of performance and changing needs '. 151 No change to the principle was made; however, additions were recommended under 'Selection and appointment process and re-election of directors', with the aim of promoting diversity by encouraging companies to consider broad sources when recruiting directors.
152
Principle 2.5 ('Companies should disclose the process for evaluating the performance of the board, its committees and individual directors') provides additional commentary regarding director 'induction and education', company culture and values, and director interactions with senior management. 153 A risk of continuing to increase female directorships rapidly is that a possible shortage of qualified candidates with directorship experience or preparation may arise. On 1 January 2010, Australian ASX 200 company boards had only 8.3 per cent female directorship representation. 154 Indeed, '55% of the new female appointments made in 2010 were women who had not previously sat on an ASX 200 board' and as female representation continues to increase, this figure is likely to remain high. 155 A fundamental aim of this principle is to support the transition of inexperienced directors into the governance structure, to improve their likelihood of performing well and, hence, to reinforce the corporation's decision to recruit diverse talent. The Australian voluntary regime aims to improve gender equality at board level, whilst ensuring optimal corporate performance. 156 Encouraging a rapid, substantial and continuous increase in this rate necessarily requires a substantial increase in the number of first-time female directors. Induction is imperative to support this process. The potential lack of cohesion of diverse boards has been noted as interfering with problem-solving efficacy. Detailing meeting arrangements ('Recommendations Summary') <http://www.asx.com.au/documents/asx-compliance/cg_ comparative_table_june_2010.pdf> 1-2. 151 CAMAC, above n 34, 52-3. 152 ASX Corporate Governance Council, Recommendations Summary, above n 150, 1-2. 153 Ibid 2. 154 AICD, above n 57. 155 Broderick, above n 54. 156 Ibid. as well as 'director interaction[s] with each other, senior executives and other stakeholders' helps the cohesiveness of a diverse board.
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Principle 3 promotes ethical and responsible decision-making, with Principle 3.2 representing the most significant amendment to the ASX's Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations. It requires the establishment of a diversity policy, the implementation of measurable objectives and the adoption of annual monitoring. 158 To assist corporations in their adoption of the amended recommendations, Principle 3.2 provides a definition of diversity, stating that it 'includes but is not limited to gender, age, ethnicity and cultural background'.
159 Measurable objectives are recommended to 'identify how you measure achievement of gender diversity objectives, for example, proportion of women in the company, senior executive positions and on the board'. 160 Supported by a diversity policy and annual monitoring, corporations that adopt the amended Principle 3.2 will be able to measure progress towards diversity targets (objectives). The implementation of measurable objectives allows variances to be identified, discussed and explained. Many subscribe to the adage that 'what gets measured gets done' and the strength of this amendment is that, whilst compliance is voluntary, it possesses a measurable element, which demands the attention of key senior personnel in Australian corporations. The progress of Australian companies towards their own pre-determined, measurable diversity objectives must be tabled, monitored and discussed periodically; in that way, diversity becomes a significant issue within the corporation. Feedback from public consultation, with which the ASX's Corporate Governance Council agreed, noted the inflexibility with which companies quantified measurable objectives in diversity policy. 161 Principle 3.3 162 requires the disclosure by companies of measurable objectives and annual progress. Accompanying commentary highlights the need for a governance culture which is supportive of diversity and female participation. 163 report the measurable objectives for achieving gender diversity set by the board in accordance with the diversity policy and progress towards achieving them'.
164
Principle 3.4 requires disclosure in annual reports of the numbers of female employees, senior executives and directors. 165 Additional commentary on the Principle suggests that the remuneration committee/board should, at least annually, review and report upon gender balance at all company levels.
Principle 8 promotes fair and responsible 166 remuneration, with Principle 8.1 requiring that the board should establish a remuneration committee, and expecting the board or remuneration committee to consider remuneration by gender as well as making some comments on gender-based remuneration.
The ASX's Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations are developed on an 'if not, why not' basis, 167 enabling listed companies to elect not to adopt any recommendation, provided they disclose reasons why it was not adopted. Since their introduction during 2003, the principles and recommendations have been voluntary. However, the cooperative premise of the document and its value as a tool to analyse the corporate governance performance of Australian companies has ensured that it was adopted by almost all listed companies. 168 The Australian framework supports the principle that it is ultimately 'for the market to pass judgement on the corporate governance practices of Australian companies' 169 and it is hoped that the 'cooperative goodwill of listed entities' will continue with regard to board gender diversity, avoiding the need for legislative intervention. 170 164 Ibid. 165 Ibid 5-6. 166 Ibid 7-8. 167 ASX Corporate Governance Council, Recommendations Summary, above n 150, 2, 6. 168 ASX Corporate Governance Council, Governance Principles, above n 127, 2. 169 '… not the Council or ASX': ibid. 170 The '[c]ooperative goodwill of listed entities has contributed to a high standard of corporate governance practice in Australia without the agency costs of "black letter" law common in other markets': ibid.
F Employee Diversity in Australia
Australia was placed fourth out of 50 nations in Forbes' 2012 'global index of employee diversity', 171 a study analysing various diversity elements, including gender, age, country of birth, part-time or full-time employment, education, income and sector.
172 New Zealand, one of Australia's nearest neighbours in both proximity and cultural values, 173 ranked second. 174 The result is encouraging for workplace diversity and the provision of equal opportunities for employees. The Forbes' study was limited, however, by inconsistent availability of statistical data for key diversity elements in participating nations. For example, the US and UK are the only two countries tracking employment data on ethnicity. 175 However, considering the elements of diversity studied and their comparative results, Australia rates in the upper echelon of nations providing equal opportunities to all employees, established by the fact of employee diversity.
G Long-Term Flow-On Effects of Employee Diversity on Board Diversity
As a leading indicator, the composite index of employee diversity bodes well for long-term Australian board diversity. By committing to diversity at the employee level, across all sectors of the economy and with consideration of all diversity elements, Australia is creating a culture of openness and acceptance of human differences. Acceptance should reduce bias, enhance employee diversity and provide opportunities for skills development, hence ensuring that individuals from diverse groups are better prepared to assume leadership and directorship positions in the future.
Investment and commitment at employee and management levels will prepare individuals from diverse representative groups for directorship positions via a 'push' strategy. encourage corporations to pursue diversity, it may achieve balanced corporate governance results in the long term.
Despite there being a significant difference between managing and directing a corporation, 176 directorship is commonly preceded by senior-executive experience. 177 Only 24 per cent of Australian senior managers are women; 178 however, Australia has the greatest proportion of female CEOs (30 per cent) of any country -an enviable result and a leading indicator for future Australian board-level gender diversity. 179 The promotion of diversity at all corporation levels and across each segment of the economy provides Australia with an opportunity to nurture qualified board talent from currently underrepresented minority groups. The Australian Human Rights Commission had made 15 recommendations in its 2010 Blueprint, all aimed at promoting gender diversity and equality. 183 Recommendation 7, 'Promoting women in Leadership', had specified that 'a target of 40% representation of each gender on all publicly-listed Boards in Australia, to be achieved over five years, should be promoted'. 184 It had further been recommended that '[i]f progress is not made, the Australian Government should consider legislating to require publicly-listed companies and other large employers to achieve a mandatory gender diversity quota of a minimum of 40% of both genders within a specified timeframe [five years], failing which penalties will be imposed'.
185
Whilst the target is ambitious, it is comparable with targets set in other countries 186 and must be pursued if Australia is to prove that voluntary regimes are a viable alternative to legislation. There are several reasons why it is important that Australia achieve the target.
First, the Australian Human Rights Commission is a respected organisation and its recommendations are considered credible. Second, the recommendation provides a quantitative target against which Australian company performance may be measured for critical analysis and to ensure progress towards a goal. Third, the recommended gender target of 40 per cent is comparable with the quota laws set by international leaders, such as Norway, since 2003. Fourth, the recommendation was made in response to, and fits comfortably within, the structure of Australia's voluntary regime (implemented via the 2010 Amendments to the ASX Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations).
181 Elizabeth Broderick, Cassandra Goldie and Elena Rosenman, 2010 Gender Equality Blueprint (June 2010) Australian Human Rights Commission, 5 <http://www.humanrights.gov.au/sites/default/files/document/publication/Gender_Equality_B lueprint.pdf>. 182 Ibid. 183 Ibid 1-7. 184 Ibid 5. 185 Ibid. 186 Armstrong and Walby, above n 5, 30-1. Fifth, the proposed timeframe (five years) is comparable with quota legislation timeframes implemented in other nations -including Norway 187 and France 188 -providing a realistic benchmark against which the progress of Australia's voluntary regime can be assessed. Sixth, the recommendation takes Australia's voluntary regime one step further in that it quantifies the measurable objectives as targets, in a manner consistent with international leaders, and it sets a reasonable timeframe for the targets to be met. In doing so, the Australian Human Rights Commission encourages Australian companies to commit to targets and achieve them.
Last, it is sometimes argued that the adoption of legislated quotas is considered to be one board gender diversity mechanism that can achieve best practice targets.
189 Structuring a voluntary mechanism with quantifiable targets comparable to those legislated in other nations is an effective method of benchmarking Australian progress. 190 For the benefits of a voluntary regime to be enjoyed by the Australian economy, there must be evidence that it is an effective alternative to legislation. The Australian Human Rights Commission recommendations certainly progress the voluntary regime further than the ASX Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations alone. 193 Obviously, progress may occur at different rates. However, it is important to track performance in order to identify shortcomings. 187 Ibid. 188 Deloitte, above n 34, 15. 189 Catherine Casey, Renate Skibnes and Judith K Pringle, 'Gender Equality and Corporate Governance: Policy Strategies in Norway and New Zealand' (2011) 18(6) Gender Work and Organization 613. 190 Ibid. 191 Broderick, above n 54. 192 AICD, above n 57. 193 Ibid. 194 The progress seems steady for listed companies, but it should be pointed out that some not-for-profit organisations and universities demonstrate much higher female governance representation. 195 In fact, Government, not-for-profit organisations and university appointments, which demonstrate much higher female governance-level representation, are encouraging. Nevertheless, it should be clear that, despite the noted improvement and clear potential, Australia has 'a long way to go '. 199 The 2010 amendments to the ASX Corporate Governance Council's Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations that required board diversity policies or an explanation why one was not adopted (under the 'if not, why not' principle) provided an impetus for an immediate improvement in the number of female appointments to ASX 200 directorships, and represented a milestone in Australia's pursuit of best practice targets through a voluntary mechanism. As can be seen from Figure 1 , immediate results 194 Gladham and Lamb, above n 142. 195 AICD, above n 57. 196 Ibid. 197 Ibid. 198 This progress suggests the government is on track to achieve its target of 40% women and followed after the amendments and it created optimism that Australia's push to voluntarily achieve best practice targets among its listed companies would be effective. An issue of concern is that, despite improvement, Australia is a long way from reaching best practice targets -even among its new appointments. To achieve a minimum representation of 40 per cent for each gender across the entire ASX 200, new appointments and existing seats would need to be distributed between genders in the targeted proportion. To remove male directors from existing seats in favour of females would initially seem difficult and contrary to the spirit of a voluntary system. The making of new appointments, however, provides an opportunity for ASX 200 companies to alter gender balance with more ease and flexibility. Despite that opportunity, as is clear from Figure 2 , the ASX 200's new appointments have fallen short of best practice targets every year. Increasing new female appointments to targeted levels alone will not achieve best practice levels across the entire ASX 200. Indeed, fewer than 10 per cent of ASX 200 director seats turn over annually;
203 the effect of new female appointments is diluted in instances where retired seats have been held by other females. Bringing the number of new female appointments to best practice levels is the next step. Despite its necessity, however, meeting best practice criteria alone will be insufficient to achieve the desired targets within reasonable timeframes. In order to achieve 40 per cent representation of both genders on ASX 200 company boards, Australia must further increase real female representation across the entire ASX 200 by 21.8 per cent. In order to achieve this target, within the five-year time period adopted in numerous jurisdictions and hence to justify the voluntary mechanism as a true equivalent to mandatory quotas, the real average annual rate of increase achieved over the past four and a half years (9.9 per cent, or an average of 2.2 per cent per year) would need to be increased by more than a factor of 20 in the next six months. At the current rate of progress (9.9 per cent over four and a half years), it will take Australia another 9.9 years to achieve 40 per cent female representation, with the target being achieved some time in mid-2024.
In order to meet the 40 per cent target from current levels (28 May 2014), women must be appointed to nearly one-quarter (21. For Australia to reach this target within a reasonable timeframe (the end of 2015 has been suggested as reasonable) -with only 165 vacancies available per year -every single appointment would need to be female for the remainder of 2014 (96 seats) and for all of 2015 (165 seats), plus 75 presently serving male directors would need to be replaced by women. We can confidently predict that that this will not occur. Indeed, it has been postulated that the best-case scenario under a voluntary mechanism is to anticipate women being appointed to a maximum of 25 per cent of directorship vacancies, 207 meaning that it would take a further nine years to achieve 40 per cent representation of both genders. 208 However, it is important to note a statistical reality: the recruitment of females at a rate of 25 per cent of total new appointments only increases female representation across the entire ASX 200 because women currently hold less than 25 per cent of all seats. Once the ASX 200 achieves 25 per cent female representation (and assuming that director seats are retired proportionately to their appointment), allocating 25 per cent of new seats to women will only maintain that level. As the achievement of 'critical mass' will render further progress uncertain, so too, will the 25 per cent ceiling present an obstacle that must be negotiated if Australia is to make its voluntary system succeed.
A voluntary regime would require ASX 200 companies to terminate large numbers of male directors and replace them with females in order to achieve the same results as a mandatory regime within a reasonable timeframe. This may seem an extreme measure and unlikely to be implemented. In order for a voluntary regime to achieve the same results as a mandatory regime, it is an option that needs to be considered seriously. The general criticisms of the voluntary system are that it is 'slow' and achieves 'small' reductions in experienced no changes at all over the 8-year period. Of the 1,652 companies listed for more than 12 months, the average annual turnover is just 13%, and for the ASX200 10.7%': Lee, above n 203. 207 Ibid. The ACSI anticipates that 40 per cent representation of each gender will not be achieved at current rates until 2030: Alembakis, above n 179. 208 Lee, above n 203. Below the ASX 200, where female participation falls, it is anticipated that this will take 13 years to achieve.
gender imbalance at board level. 209 The challenge is immense; the rewards are great, but the risks are real.
As more nations implement quota legislation and progress towards best practice targets, Australia will face greater political pressure to report comparable statistics. Australian companies must redress gender imbalance or risk losing the benefits of a voluntary system. International comparisons with Australia's progress over coming years will be intriguing, as more nations roll out quota legislation.
IX SOME TRENDS AND CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
A Holistic Approach to Board Diversity in the International Context
Nations aiming to achieve board level diversity should be alert to the benefits of holistic approaches, which may help to achieve sustainable reductions in gender imbalance. Specifically, the design and implementation of collaborative push and pull strategies in conjunction may help to realise such objectives. Simply setting quota legislation targets and 'pulling' minority groups onto boards to satisfy reporting requirements risks corporate performance suffering under the governance of unqualified, inexperienced directors. Such an occurrence would be detrimental to long-term board diversity and equality. By comparison, the development of expertise and qualifications in individuals from all (diverse) talent pools provides a better opportunity for directorship success; it supports improved corporate performance and hence reinforces diverse director appointments.
The 'right [board-level] gender balance' can be achieved through the recruitment of an appropriate mix of well-qualified directors from all talent pools, with a view to furthering a corporation's objectives. 210 This method acknowledges 'gender' within the broader context of diversity.
211 Corporate Australia is being encouraged to embrace such an approach, and gender diversity has, since 2010, been a prominent feature of the voluntary corporate 209 Armstrong and Walby, above n 5. 210 CAMAC, above n 34, 51. 211 Ibid. governance regime applicable to ASX listed companies. 212 The use of such an approach follows its success in the government sector and some not-for-profit sectors in Australia.
Some scholars correlate board diversity with corporate performance; gender imbalance spawns social inequity and disparate participation levels. Hence, it is imperative that Australian board and senior executive diversity continues to increase. The ASX Corporate Governance Council argues that companies and countries that are able to use all talent will be better placed to achieve global (and local) success, whilst enjoying the benefits of greater equality. 213 In order to reduce board gender imbalance, strategies addressing the underlying causes of the imbalance need to be implemented, and rates of progression towards equality achieved in recent years need to be maintained.
B
Not-for-Profit and Government Experience
In the not-for-profit and government sectors in Australia, a range of methods has been used to achieve greater board diversity. They have included policy change; coalitions of support from experienced male corporate board directors, with experienced business and government board members acting together; and changes in the organisational culture of certain types of not-forprofit organisations. Elizabeth Broderick has noted that the barriers to the equitable progression of women in the workplace fall into three categories, which broadly correlate to the argument about the need for change in the outer and inner context and through content. These barriers are:
(a) belief barriers -deeply held cultural beliefs such as the good mother stereotype, the ideal worker stereotype (content);
(b) cultural barriers -selection, promotion and career development systems which disadvantage women (inner context); and (c) structural barriers -the lack of affordable childcare, no paid parental leave scheme 214 (outer context).
With mandatory regimes, it has been proven that corporate boards in those countries having adopted them can achieve targeted levels of gender representation. Following the argument through, if targeted voluntary levels are 'equitable' then the 'right gender balance' may be achieved.
C Mandated Quotas Will Achieve Results, but Is It the Desirable Method?
Mandated quota legislation in countries such as Norway has achieved gender diversity. Norway is the country with the highest participation of women at board level (36 per cent), the result of mandating a quota system for publicly listed companies. 215 However, the pressure of legal sanctions may lead to inappropriate directorship appointments. Further, legal sanctions may alienate those who might otherwise champion change for greater board diversity. It was reported in Norway in 2012 216 that around 70 female managers share 300 board positions among themselves. 217 They have been nicknamed 'golden skirts'. 218 This development is viewed with scepticism, especially considering the potential conflicts of interest associated with membership on multiple boards. 219 There is a risk that Australia may follow this pattern, particularly among the ASX 200 where 164 women currently hold 230 directorships (equating to 28 per cent of women having multiple directorships). 220 The higher level of concentrated participation by females has been expressed as a concern, with 'females by far having more multiple board memberships'.
D Significant Progress without Mandatory Quota Legislation
Initiatives introduced through the ASX Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations are astute and have driven substantial improvement. 222 Fair and ethical remuneration, the promotion of a culture of female participation, the provision of sufficient induction, training and education for new directors, commitment to diversity policy, and the establishment of transparent board appointment procedures with a focus on considering all talent sources, are just some actions introduced through the 2010 amendments to the ASX Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations. 223 Other actions which might be pursued include extending the mentoring of potential female directors by experienced directors; the mentoring of women by men in CEO positions; the provision of a voice for change for women through peak bodies, such as Women on Boards; and the lobbying of government for change in the corporate sector, as has occurred in the government and some parts of the notfor-profit sectors.
Despite the apparent success of Australia's voluntary regime, the test of its substance will arise in coming years. Australian corporate governance will face challenges in pushing beyond the point of 'critical mass' and closing the gap between the current level of 15.8 per cent female board participation and best practice (40 per cent) in the face of competition from countries which have enacted legislative quotas.
Australia has a strong voluntary strategy, which is arguably preferable to legislation. Both the government sector and parts of the not-for-profit sector provide lessons on how to achieve board diversity in its broadest sense in a voluntary regime. Driven by a desire for continuous improvement, by women taking individual action in their careers, 224 by powerful men who support 222 As discussed further above, the improvement noted following the introduction of the ASX Corporate Governance Council's Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations with 2010 amendments was immediate and substantial. Although commencing from a low base and despite leaving much work still to complete, the voluntary mechanism has achieved a substantial improvement. 223 
X OVERALL SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This article has analysed Australian board diversity, in an international context, with particular emphasis upon gender. Although gender represents but one element of board diversity, over the past decade it has been the subject of substantial international scrutiny, debate and political action, making it certainly the most topical. The correlation between board gender diversity and enhanced corporate performance is supported by empirical research. The authors have pointed out that this correlation is subject to numerous counter-arguments; however, there is a very widely held view that gender diversity is a matter of good corporate governance even if it is still inconclusive whether there is a business case to be made out for including a certain percentage of males or females on boards. The board gender debate has inspired change, providing a solid foundation upon which the international community -corporate and non-corporate -can improve performance in all elements of board diversity.
The change process has evolved through several phases, which were outlined in an historical framework. As the debate has progressed, international best practice targets have developed, with nations implementing various mechanisms, policies and laws to contribute domestically to the amelioration of a global issue. These mechanisms possess unique advantages and disadvantages, with the practical implementation of each achieving change by varying degrees of speed and magnitude. Similarly, each mechanism exposes its nation to unique and specific risks -a fact which may be overlooked in the rush to improve statistics.
Norway is the proven international leader, achieving best practice among its listed companies by enacting mandatory quota legislation. In response, numerous countries have followed Norway's lead by introducing their own women'. Whilst not suggesting that women be rude and unlikeable in the workplace, she noted the workplace challenges that might explain why a smaller percentage of women than men reach the top of their professions. Creating the opportunity and encouraging participation, whilst removing barriers to female career development, are essential processes. Coupled with a drive from women -a belief that they deserve as much as men any promotion, opportunity or progression for which they are equally qualified -will lead to a multi-faceted approach that will decrease the imbalance. quota legislation. However, critics of this measure argue that quota legislation results in window dressing and presents risks to the integrity and strength of corporate governance. Certainly, the ideal scenario is for organisations to voluntarily achieve board gender equality, thereby retaining discretion over directorship appointments, and avoiding compliance costs and penalties whilst committing to a culture of gender equity by choice. However, in the corporate world, voluntary mechanisms have achieved slower and less significant results. For such mechanisms to be successful, it is essential to push beyond the tipping point, within reasonable timeframes, to achieve board gender diversity.
Australian progress towards best practice targets has improved (from a low base) since the 2010 introduction of the ASX Corporate Governance Council's amendments to Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations. However, statistics place Australia behind global leaders. This article has analysed mechanisms used to improve board gender diversity and Australia's progress towards best practice. Furthermore, an assessment has been made of the opportunity that exists for Australia to become the first nation to achieve best practice in its corporate sector using a voluntary strategy. It is evident that, in doing so, much can be learnt from other nations and from the Australian not-for-profit, university and government sectors. 
